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  The size and pattern of any public budget depend, among other factors, on the 
visibility of both the burdens and the benefits of public revenue and public expenditure. 
Furthermore, such visibility is a necessary - not a sufficient - condition for an efficient 
allocation of resources between the private and public sectors of an economy. 
 
  The aim of this contribution, based on a recent research, is to simultaneously 
present additive and arithmetic indicators for local, intermediate and central territorial 
government levels and to initially apply them to Spain by using data and information 
provided by the International Monetary Fund. Conclusions and comments are offered for 
general criticism, discussion, theoretical development and future application to other 
OECD countries.   2 
1. INTRODUCTION 
  In 1903 a Teoría della Illusione Finanziaria, by Amilcare Puviane, was published 
in Italy. Starting from previous studies
1 and probably influenced by the political doctrine of 
Maquiavelo [Rodríguez Bereijo, 1972, page X], Puviani denounced the utilization of 
mechanisms and cunning arguments by governments to conceal taxpayers a significant part 
of their tax burdens. Subsequently several followers of the Public Choice school
2 drew 
important conclusions concerning a systematic trend to a public over-provision of goods 
and services as far as their benefits seemed evident to citizens and, quite the opposite, a 
substantial part of the tax burdens were hardly noticeable by them. On the other hand, other 
authors [Galbraith, 1958; Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989] considered that the political 
process drove or could drive to a public under-provision, remarking that "while tax-payers 
may underestimate their burden, they may also underestimate expenditure benefits... there 
is a cross-current of forces and the net effect is by no means evident" [Musgrave and 
Musgrave, 1989, pp. 100-1]. 
  The importance of the visibility issue from both the Pareto allocative efficiency and 
the social equity points of view is evident: if the several types of economic burdens for 
citizens embedded in the public revenue (the income effect, the substitution effect, the 
compliance cost of taxes...) are lower than the benefits perceived by them from publicly 
provided goods and services, a permanent factor will permanently distort both the size - 
public over-provision - and the pattern - over-provision of goods and services with the most 
visible benefits -. Quite the opposite, if the several types of economic burdens of public 
revenue are more noticeable than the benefits of public expenditure, this asymmetry will 
drive to both a systematic under-provision of goods and services and a distorted pattern of 
public budget. Hence the unquestionable interest in knowing and measuring the 
phenomenon of fiscal illusion or, in other words, its opposite magnitude, fiscal visibility, 
since only measurable things can be controlled. 
  In order to assess the direct monetary burden of taxes, that is, their income effect, 
the Herfindahl index of concentration was initially used, starting from the supposition - not 
                                                           
    
1"Teoría della Illusione nelle Entrate Pubbliche", Annali della Facoltá di Giurisprudenza 
dell'Universitá di Perugia, 1897; "Osservazioni sulla Spinta Contributiva delle Tasse", 
Giornale degli Economisti, vol. XV, II, 1897, pp. 106-28; "Illusione Finanziaria Mediante 
Associazione delle Pene delle Imposte fra Loro e con Altre Pene", Giornale degli 
Economisti, 1898, pp. 118-35. 
    
2See, for instance, J.M. Buchanan in Public Finance in a Democratic Process, University 
of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1967.   3 
always right - that the so called direct taxes (in rem and personal taxes on income and 
wealth, or income source taxes) were fully perceptible by tax-payers and indirect taxes (on 
expenditure or income use taxes) were not noticeable or less noticeable. In addition to this, 
attempts to estimate fiscal illusion mainly focused on public revenue, neglecting public 
expenditure probably because the visibility of its benefits seemed more evident given the 
interest displayed by politicians and bureaucrats to exaggerate such benefits. 
  However, such past approaches have suffered from two serious lacks or constraints: 
A) First, the Herfindahl index does not take into consideration several factors which can 
decisively influence the perception of the burdens by taxpayers, such as: 
a) The internal structure of every tax. 
b) The possible economic shifting of the income effect by the legal taxpayer onto other 
economic agents according to both market structures and changing economic situation. 
B) Second, it is not evident, in spite of the political and bureaucratic publicity, that citizens 
are fully aware of benefits received from all services provided to them by public 
expenditure. Because of the non-rival consumption nature of some services, many 
economic agents are neither fully aware of the goods they are consuming nor the quantities 
or costs of public services. 
  Hence the need to estimate burdens and benefits of public revenue and expenditure 
by using more complete indicators covering both sides of the public budget simultaneously. 
  After referring to some contributions on the topic of fiscal illusion, the aim of this 
contribution is to combine two types of indicators - multiplicative and additive -, recently 
used for measuring such a phenomenon, and to apply them to the three levels of Spanish 
territorial governments. Then important conclusions to guide a future reform of the public 




  The visibility of the burdens of the public revenue has been changing in the course 
of time depending on both economic, technical and cultural circumstances (development 
level of a country, degree of tax literacy of taxpayers...) and political and administrative 
(mechanisms of fiscal illusion utilized by governments, bureaucrats and interest groups to 
overcome resistance of taxpayers) factors [Wagner, 1976; Borcherding, 1977; Buchanan 
and Wagner, 1977; Fiorina and Noll, 1978; Pommerehne and Schneider, 1978; Brennan 
and Buchanan, 1980; Frey y Pommerehne, 1982; Oates, 1988; Tullock, 1989; Tabellini and 
Alesina, 1990; Dunleavy, 1991; Mueller, 1993; Roig-Alonso, 1998; Roig-Alonso, 2002]. 
In a similar way, the degree of compliance of such a visibility requirement by fiscal   4 
systems now in force can vary remarkably among OECD countries [Roig-Alonso, 2003]. 
  As regards public expenditure, the public or private, the final or intermediate 
nature, the spacial effects or dimensions, the administrative costs and other characteristics 
of publicly provided goods and services are factors determining the visibility of their 
benefits [Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen, 1981; Solano, 1983; Hamilton, 1983; Becker, 
1983, 1985; Mueller and Murell, 1985, 1986; Mueller, 1987, Wolff, 1987; Henrekson, 
1992; Roig-Alonso, 1998, 2002]. 
  In any case it is necessary to have logical indicators to measure, insofar as it is 
possible, how much the burdens and benefits of public local, intermediate, central or 
federal budgets are visible for the economic agents of any country at any moment. 
 
3. AN INDEX OF BURDEN VISIBILITY OF TOTAL PUBLIC REVENUE 
  In general, for every level, L, of territorial public administrations of an economy, a 
visibility index, VL
R, of its total public revenue, R, was defined in such a way that 0 ≤  VL
R 
≤ 1, based on the following formula: 








L   ∑  
where: 
a) n = number of types of public revenue R for level L of territorial public administrations; 
b) xiL
R = relative financial weight of public revenue R of type i for level L of territorial 
public administrations, with i = 1, 2, ..., n; that is to say: 
0 ≤ 
GF









 ≤ 1 
with GFiL
R = absolute quantity of public revenue R of type i for level L of territorial public 
administrations; 
c) yiL
R = visibility or perceptibility (for the policy intended - or legal - revenue-provider) 
factor of burden of public revenue R of type i to which level L of territorial public 
administrations is entitled, with 0 ≤ yiL
R ≤ 1. 
 
4. BURDEN VISIBILITY OF A SPECIFIC PUBLIC REVENUE 
  An objective estimate of yiL
R - factor of perceptibility of the direct burden by a 
policy intended - or legal - revenue-provider of a public revenue R of type i for level L of 
territorial public administrations - was initially defined [Roig-Alonso, 1998] according to 







R (1)   5 
where: 
a) viL
R = voluntary (viL
R = 0) or coercive (viL
R = 1) nature of public revenue R of type i for 
its policy intended - or legal - revenue-provider (coerciveness parameter), with 0 ≤ viL
R ≤ 1. 
b) piL
R = full (piL
R = 0) or null (piL
R = 1) proportionality of the quantity of public revenue 
R of type i - the burden of which is borne by a policy intended - or legal - revenue-provider 
- to the cost of efficiently producing the good or service specifically received by him in 
return for his burden (proportionality parameter), with 0 ≤ piL
R ≤ 1. 
c) miL
R = full (miL
R = 1) or null (miL
R = 0) information to the policy intended - or legal - 
revenue-provider on the concept of the direct burden he is bearing when providing public 
revenue R of type i (concept-information parameter), with 0 ≤ miL
R ≤ 1. 
d) qiL
R = full (qiL
R = 1) or null (qiL
R = 0) information to the policy intended - or legal - 
revenue-provider on the quantity of the direct burden he is bearing when providing public 
revenue R of type i (quantity-information parameter), with 0 ≤ qiL
R ≤ 1. 
e) iiL
R = intermediate (iiL
R = 0) or final (iiL
R = 1) position of the policy intended - or legal - 
revenue-provider in relation to his direct burden (burden-shifting parameter), with 0 ≤ iiL
R 
≤ 1. 








R were continuous 
variables ranging from 0 to 1, i and L were subscripts for the type of revenue and level of 
territorial public administration respectively and R was a superscript - non an exponent - 
for public revenue. 
  Because of the multiplicative combination of such five significant parameters in 
yiL
R, as any one of them takes a null value a 0 estimate will necessarily result, although 
other parameters can show high values. 
  In order to avoid this problem, this visibility or perceptibility factor can be 
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5. AN INDEX OF BENEFIT VISIBILITY OF TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURE 
  Similarly to the case of public revenue, for every level of territorial public 
administrations, L, a general index, VL
E, of benefit visibility of total public expenditure, E, 
was be defined in such a way that 0 ≤ VL
E ≤ 1, based on the following formula: 








L   ∑  
where: 
a) q = number of types of public expenditure E performed by level L of territorial public 
administrations;   6 
b) xfL
E = relative financial weight of public expenditure E of type f performed by level L of 
territorial public administrations, with f = 1, 2, ..., q; that is to say: 
0 ≤ 
GF









 ≤ 1 
with GFfL
E = absolute quantity of public expenditure E of type f performed by level L of 
territorial public administrations; 
c) yfL
E = visibility or perceptibility (by the policy intended - or legal - consumer) factor of 
benefit of public expenditure E of type f performed by level L of territorial public 
administrations, where 0 ≤ yfL
E ≤ 1. 
 
6. BENEFIT VISIBILITY OF A SPECIFIC PUBLIC EXPENDITURE 
  An objective estimate of yfL
E (factor of perceptibility by a policy intended - or legal 
- consumer of the direct benefit of a public expenditure E of type f performed by level L of 










E = null (vfL
E = 0) or full (vfL
E = 1) consumption of a publicly supplied good of type f 
by its policy intended - or legal - user or beneficiary (consumption parameter), with 0 ≤ 
vfL
E ≤ 1. 
b) pfL
E = full (pfL
E = 0) or null (pfL
E = 1) proportionality of cost of efficient production of 
the publicly supplied good of type f to a specifically requited monetary burden borne by the 




E = full (mfL
E = 1) or null (mfL
E = 0) information to the policy intended - or legal - 
consumer or user on the concept of the direct benefit he is receiving when public 




E = full (qfL
E = 1) or null (qfL
E = 0) information to the policy intended - or legal - 
consumer or user on the quantity of the direct benefit he is receiving when public 
expenditure E of type f is performed (quantity-information parameter), with 0 ≤ qfL
E ≤ 1. 
e) ifL
E = intermediate (ifL
E = 0) or final (ifL
E = 1) position of the policy intended - or legal - 
user or beneficiary of the publicly supplied good of type f in relation to his direct benefit 
(benefit-shifting parameter), with 0 ≤ ifL
E ≤ 1. 









E were continuous variables always ranging from 0 to 1, f and L were subscripts   7 
for the type of public expenditure and level of territorial public administration respectively 
and E was a superscript - non an exponent - for public expenditure. 
  Again, as anyone of such five parameters takes value 0, the multiplicative 
combination of them in yfL
E necessarily results in a 0 estimate although other parameters 
can show high values; and in order to avoid this problem, this visibility or perceptibility 
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7. VISIBILITY ESTIMATES OF BURDENS AND BENEFITS FROM TOTAL 
PUBLIC REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE FOR SPAIN 
  Tables 1 to 4 respectively present multiplicative and additive estimates on burden 
and benefit visibility of public revenue and expenditure for the three territorial government 
levels in Spain by applying indices previously defined, to the central, intermediate and 
local fiscal sub-systems now in force in such country. 
  To obtain a sensitivity analysis, three hypotheses on minimum, plausible, and 
maximum shifting of tax burden and expenditure benefit have been assumed, giving rise to 
the corresponding series of maximum, VM, plausible, Vp, and minimum, Vm, values of 
weighted-visibility estimates of revenue burden for policy intended - or legal - revenue-
providers and expenditure benefit for policy intended - or legal - beneficiaries or 
consumers. The initial values for the fiscal visibility parameters v, p, m, q, iM, ip, im  are the 
same previously used [Roig-Alonso, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2003]. 
  As regards results, according to: 
A) Table 1, presenting multiplicative VM, Vp, and Vm visibility estimates of burdens from 
revenue and grants, shows that the central government level has the most visible sub-
system and the intermediate level the least visible one: plausible values range from 42.38 to 
17.53, with a very significant difference of 24.85 points. 
B) Table 2, presenting additive VM, Vp, and Vm visibility estimates of burdens revenue and 
grants, confirms that the central government level has the most visible sub-system and the 
intermediate level the least visible one. Now plausible values range from 83.01 to 40.47, 
increasing the previous difference to 42.54 points. 
C) Table 3, presenting multiplicative VM, Vp, and Vm visibility estimates of benefit of 
public expenditure, shows that the central government level again has the most visible sub-
system and the intermediate level the least visible one, but now plausible values range from 
32.28 to 26.31, with a difference of 5.97 points only. 
C) Table 4, presenting additive VM, Vp, and Vm visibility estimates of benefit of public 
expenditure, confirms that the central government level has the most visible sub-system   8 
and the intermediate level the least visible one, with plausible values ranging from 81.25 to 
77.39, with a non-significant difference of 3.86 points.   9 
TABLE 1 
Burden Visibility of Public Revenue in Spain by Territorial Government Levels 
Multiplicative Estimates (in percent) 
 
Territorial Levels VM Vp Vm
Central  level  69.53% 42.38% 15.74% 
Intermediate level  26.42%  17.53%  8.91% 
Local  level  47.31% 32.16% 17.54% 
 
Source: The author's elaboration from data on Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 
2002 [IMF, Washington, 2003].   10 
TABLE 2 
Burden Visibility of Public Revenue in Spain by Territorial Government Levels 
Additive Estimates (in percent) 
 
Territorial Levels VM Vp Vm
Central  level  88.69% 83.01% 76.20% 
Intermediate  level  42.47% 40.47% 38.48% 
Local  level  64.67% 60.98% 57.31% 
 
 
Source: The author's elaboration from data on Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 
2002 [IMF, Washington, 2003].   11 
TABLE 3 
Benefit Visibility of Public Expenditure in Spain by Territorial Government Levels 
Multiplicative Estimates (in percent) 
 
Territorial Levels VM Vp Vm
Central  level  41.36% 32.28% 23.10% 
Intermediate  level  35.22% 26.31% 15.83% 
Local  level  37.52% 27.13% 16.83% 
 
 
Source: The author's elaboration from data on Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 
2002 [IMF, Washington, 2003].   12 
TABLE 4 
Benefit Visibility of Public Expenditure in Spain by Territorial Government Levels 
Additive Estimates (in percent) 
 
Territorial Levels VM Vp Vm
Central  level  85.61% 81.25% 76.97% 
Intermediate  level  82.26% 77.39% 72.53% 
Local  level  84.04% 79.10% 74.19% 
 
 
Source: The author's elaboration from data on Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 
2002 [IMF, Washington, 2003].   13 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
  The quality of public revenue and expenditure sub-systems and systems as policy 
instruments for efficiently allocating economic resources among private and public sectors 
and sub-sectors varies as a result of economic, political, and social factors. 
  The new and alternative indices of fiscal visibility previously redefined by 
combining significant parameters in multiplicative and additive formulas bring forward a 
better measurement methodology which can be used to make relevant quantified 
comparisons among member countries of the International Monetary Fund provided that 
detailed statistic figures on execution of public budgets as well as information about the 
nature of the different types of public administrations' revenue and expenditure 
programmes are available to researchers. 
  Estimates obtained from different assumptions on tax and expenditure shifting by 
combining these multiplicative and additive indices to measure the visibility of revenue 
burden and public expenditure benefit of central, intermediate, and local fiscal sub-systems 
now in force in Spain offer, in addition to the previous remarks, the following observations: 
First, low multiplicative visibility values of burdens of public revenue for all territorial 
government levels. On the other hand, divergences among estimated values by levels of 
government are very significant as a result of the concurrence of several asymmetrical 
factors such as non-coerciveness, non-existence of specific requitals, lack of information on 
concepts and quantities, partial shifting of burdens by tax-payers, intergovernmental grants, 
etc. 
Second, additive visibility values of burdens of public revenue for the same territorial 
government levels which are far from the optimal value - 100.00 -, specially at the 
intermediate level. Divergences among estimates values are now very significant - more 
than 40 points - between the central and intermediate levels, although less relevant for the 
local level - about 20 and 23 points -. 
Third, also low multiplicative visibility values of benefits of public expenditure for the 
three territorial government levels, particularly owing to the lack of sufficient information 
to consumers and users on concepts, quantities or costs of publicly provided goods and 
services. Now the main existing divergence - about 6 points - among government levels has 
been considerably reduced. 
Fourth, additive visibility values of benefits of public expenditure for the same territorial 
government levels which are far from the optimal value. Divergences among estimated 
values are now little significant - about 4 points - between the central and the intermediate 
levels. 
Fifth, by comparing multiplicative estimates from public revenue and expenditure, the   14 
following traits can be remarked: 
A) At the central level of government the burden visibility of public revenue is significantly 
higher than the benefit visibility, suggesting a clear trend to public sub-provision of goods 
and services. 
B) At the intermediate level of government the burden visibility of public revenue is 
significantly lower than the benefit visibility, suggesting a clear trend to public over-
provision of goods and services. 
C) At the local level of government the burden visibility of public revenue is higher than 
the benefit visibility, suggesting a smooth trend to public sub-provision of goods and 
services. 
Sixth, by comparing additive estimates from public revenue and expenditure, the following 
traits can be remarked: 
A') At the central level of government the burden visibility of public revenue is slightly 
higher than the benefit visibility, suggesting a trend to a balance in the public provision of 
goods and services. 
B) At the intermediate level of government the burden visibility of public revenue is again 
significantly lower than the benefit visibility, confirming a clear trend to a public over-
provision of goods and services. 
C) On the contrary, at the local level of government the burden visibility of public revenue 
is lower than the benefit visibility, suggesting a trend to a public over-provision of goods 
and services. 
Seventh, in any case economic policy implications of both types - multiplicative and 
additive - of estimates seem clear for all territorial government levels: as, in general, 
present visibility values of both burdens of public revenue and benefits of public 
expenditure are far their optimal values, important allocation improvements can be reached 
with reforms and changes raising all values in general. 
Eighth, estimates shown on tables 1 to 4 suggest without doubt that the Spanish local level 
of government, mainly consisting of municipalities, can result very benefited with future 
reforms and changes simultaneously aiming the following objectives: 
A) Reductions in a) the public deficit of the local public administration, b) grants received 
from higher government levels (by strengthen the local taxation) and c) fundamental 
changes of the local taxes by replacing present levies which can be easily deducted or 
shifted by legal taxpayers by other types of revenue (as a local share in the personal income 
tax) which are more difficult to be shifted onto non legal tax-payers. 
B) More and better specific and personalized information to consumers of publicly 
provided goods and services on the nature, quantities and costs of all types of such goods   15 
and services.   16 
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